It is no coincidence that the American Century overlapped the rise and fall of 100-year-old General Motors, which had become the largest, most profitable company in the world by the time it reached middle age. Now being read its last rites in the bankruptcy courts, the shock of GM's downfall has been dulled by other spectacular corporate collapses and multibillion-dollar taxpayer lifelines. But if the phrase, “end of an era”, has been overused lately, it surely applies in this case.
Telling an average American 50 years ago that more cars would be sold in “Red China” than in the US and that GM would go bust, bailed out with government cash largely borrowed from Beijing, would have led them to question your sanity. The economic changes that have made both of these a reality this year were often too gradual to appreciate. GM may have faced a bad year, a nasty strike or a loss in market share to an oddly named Japanese company with what seemed like odd little cars, but its solidity was an article of faith, even as it shifted from a case study of corporate efficiency to one of sclerotic management. On the eve of the first energy crisis, almost every other car sold in the world's largest market was still made by GM. But rigid labour agreements, hungry competitors and decades of short-term, unimaginative leadership took their toll.
GM's re-emergence as a new, slimmed-down corporate entity is hardly in doubt given the massive financial and political capital committed to it. Stripped of crushing debt and its weakest dealerships and brands, it should make money at the outset. Turning a profit after going through the wringer of Chapter 11 is far easier than reversing decades of industrial decline, though. There may still be car companies with headquarters in the US decades from now but, sadly, the changes being imposed on the newest ward of the state are too mild and the rise of Asian rivals too far advanced to bring GM back to more than a shadow of its former dominance.