Yet, as with subprime, these structured loans no longer look so smart. Many of the biggest users of these pre-IPO convertibles were in sectors that are now reeling, particularly Asian real estate. Essentially debt with equity upside, they were predicated on initial public offerings at bloated 2007-style multiples, upwards of 30 times projected earnings. Many deals were written at the top of the market when participation was more important than analysis. In the worst cases, term sheets barely covered an A4 sheet of paper and due diligence was often cursory. Now that the IPO exit is effectively shuttered, hedge funds and other investors find themselves loaded up with illiquid paper they have no way of marking to market. Sound familiar?
然而，與次貸一樣，這些結構性貸款看上去不再那么風光。這些首次公開發行(IPO)前可轉換證券(pre-IPO convertibles)的許多最大用戶都身處目前陷入困境的行業，特別是亞洲房地產行業。這些證券本質上是具備股票優勢的債務，其基礎是IPO以2007年那種膨脹的市盈率——超出預期收益30倍——進行。許多交易是在市場見頂時進行的，當時參與要比分析更為重要。在最糟糕的情況下，投資條款清單幾乎還不足一頁A4紙，盡職調查也往往十分粗略。由于目前IPO出口實際上已然關閉，對沖基金和其他投資者發現，自己手頭凈是些無法按市值計價、不能變現的票據。聽起來有些耳熟？