Iceland's Glitnir Bank was among the first casualties. One of the many vicious circles in this crisis ensnared Iceland's banks: they were deemed too risky because the country's central bank seemed not to be a credible lender of last resort, while the government and central bank were deemed not credible because they might have to take over the banks.
The markets hit Glitnir first. Like fellow Icelandic banks Landsbanki and Kaupthing, Glitnir was solvent. All posted good first-half results, all had healthy capital adequacy ratios, and their dependence on market funding was no greater than their peers'. None held any toxic securities. These banks had been managed well since their “mini-crisis” in early 2006.
No matter – when foreign short-run credit lines closed, Glitnir had to request a short-term loan from the Central Bank of Iceland, which refused. Rather than taking Glitnir into administration, the CBI enforced nationalisation on punitive terms. The governor, David Oddsson, was prime minister for 13 years prior to moving to the CBI in 2005. His decision reflected politics, technical incompetence and ignorance of markets, and his comments thereafter were highly destabilising.